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ABSTRACT 
In December 2014, General Motors closed its flagship Opel plant in Bochum after 52 
years of operation following years of economic struggles in the industrial Ruhr-valley 
region of northwestern Germany, marking the first closure of a major German 
automobile plant since 1945. This study examines the primary underlying causes of the 
landmark closure, such as the insolvency of GM-Opel and tense employer-employee 
relations compounded by unsatisfactory trade union negotiations between GM-Opel and 
IG Metall. Subsequent social and economic reactions to the closure are also examined, 
including the yearlong “This is not Detroit” campaign launched by local Bochum artists 
to inspire alternative uses for the site of the plant after the closure.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In December 2014, General Motors closed its flagship Opel plant in Bochum 
after 52 years of operation amidst years of a general economic downturn in the 
industrial Ruhr-valley region of northwestern Germany, marking the first closure of 
a major German automobile plant since 1945. This study seeks to examine the 
primary underlying causes of the landmark closure, such as the insolvency of GM-
Opel and tense employer-employee relations compounded by unsatisfactory trade 
union negotiations between GM-Opel, IG Metall (German Metalworkers’ Union), the 
Bochum works council, and local shop stewards. Subsequent social and economic 
reactions to the closure are also examined, including the yearlong “This is not Detroit” 
campaign launched by local Bochum artists to inspire alternative uses for the site of 
the plant after the closure. 
Bochum lies in the economically-depressed Ruhrgebiet (Ruhr valley region), 
and the Opel plant there was the primary source of employment for 3,500 locals, 
though it employed up to 22,000 employees at its peak employment. The GM-Opel 
brand has been steadily declining in European popularity in the past few decades, and 
as a result they have scaled down their German operations significantly.  
The Opel Bochum plant was scheduled to stop vehicle production there in 
2016, which would mark the first time that a carmaker closed a plant in Germany in 
decades. However, due to financial difficulties incurred by General Motors, the 
timeline was misjudged and the plant was closed swiftly, producing its last Zafira 
Tourer in late 2014. Only about 300 of the former 3,500 employees are expected to 
remain employed by Opel in a parts operation; the others face an uncertain future.  
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During its operation, the Opel plant was the primary source of employment for 
a large portion of Bochum’s population; this problem was only compounded as 
another major employer in the area (a Nokia plant) was closed in 2008. The main 
industrial employers that remain are the Ruhr University Bochum and those 
businesses that are associated with it. This means that the city now faces significant 
economic uncertainty, as workers are either struggling to find new employment 
within a reasonable distance of their homes or relocating to find work while the 
property of the former Opel Bochum plant waits to be redeveloped by new owners. 
The original scope of this thesis was to draw parallels between these outcomes and 
what happened because of the General Motors plant closure in Detroit, which 
contributed to the formation of the “ghost town” of Detroit and its subsequent 
financial hardships; however, the scope of the research quickly became too large to 
manage, and so this thesis was then scaled down to offer an in-depth case study of the 
historic closure to better understand the various factors surrounding the closure and 
the implications thereof. 
   
2. Background Information  
 
2.1 Bochum and the Ruhrgebiet 
 
Bochum is a relatively populous city that lies in the economically depressed 
Ruhrgebiet, or Ruhr valley region, which is located within the state of North-Rhine 
Westphalia in northwestern Germany. The Ruhr valley region and its administrative 
divisions is highlighted in Fig. 1 below. 
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Fig. 1: Vietor, Bierte, T. Hoppe, and Joy Clancy. “Siting of the Ruhr Valley region in 
Germany and administrative divisions.” ResearchGate, 2016. Web. 2 Mar. 2017. 
 
With an approximate population density of 2,800 persons/km2 and a total 
estimated population of 8.5 million people, the Ruhr valley region is currently the 
largest urban area in Germany, and the third largest in the European Union  
(Demographia). 
The Ruhr-valley is historically known for its extensive mining and industrial 
operations, which is why the region experienced a significant economic downtown in 
the 1950s when the national German economy strayed from mining coal to focus on 
oil and natural gas as their primary source of energy. Many cities in the Ruhr 
experienced a significant economic collapse, and the last mine in Bochum was 
officially closed in 1972 (Henning, “Germany: GM Opel”). Many former mine workers 
and other industrial workers found themselves out of work, and many turned to large 
local manufacturers such as Adam Opel AG for employment in their factories. Thus, 
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these large manufacturers and their plants quickly became a major source of income 
for the region, such as Opel and Nokia.   
 
2.2 General Motors and Adam Opel AG in Europe 
 
General Motors Company (GM) is an American multinational corporation with 
headquarters in Detroit, Michigan. Founded originally in 1908 as the “General Motors 
Corporation”, GM is typically recognized in the automotive industry for the cars they 
manufacture, though they have also traded quite heavily in financial services as well. 
GM was recognized as the largest automotive manufacturer from 1931 until 2005, 
and again in 2011. GM produces vehicles around the world under twelve brands, one 
of which is Adam Opel AG, which was under the control of General Motors Europe.  
General Motors Europe (known as “GM Europe”, or simply “GME”) was a 
subsidiary of GM established in 1986 and was responsible for all operations of GM 
businesses in Europe. The primary GME brands were England-based Vauxhall and 
Germany-based Opel. GME experienced significant financial difficulties in the 
European market for many years, and the corporation declared bankruptcy in 2009. 
GM Europe was officially declared defunct in 2010.  
Adam Opel AG (typically known only as “Opel”) is headquartered in 
Rüsselsheim in Hesse, Germany and was originally acquired by GM in 1929. Opel 
manufactures mostly passenger and light commercial vehicles, as well as various 
vehicle components for worldwide distribution within the GM Europe production 
network. Opel traces its roots to a sewing machine manufacturer founded by Adam 
Opel in 1862. This manufacturer then produced its first bicycle in 1886 which led to 
its eventual start in the automobile manufacturing industry in 1899. Prior to World 
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War II, Adam Opel AG was recognized as the largest motor vehicle manufacturer in 
Europe. Opel had several of its plants in Germany, and Opel Bochum was one of their 
most productive plants.  
It is also important to note a fundamental difference between Opel and other 
notable contemporary automobile manufacturers, as this difference affected how 
business operations were communicated within the company structure. Whereas 
most of the recognizable auto manufacturers are either fully American (i.e. Ford) or 
fully German (i.e. Volkswagen or BMW) owned and operated, Opel operates as a 
German subsidiary, yet is owned by an American company (General Motors). This has 
created some cultural disconnect in how changes in business operations are 
communicated within the company structure, as fully American manufacturers 
typically follow a top-down executive style of decision making, whereas fully German 
manufacturers typically engage in traditional negotiations with local works councils 
and trade unions to make decisions that will impact the workforce.  
 
2.3 IG Metall and Trade Unions in Germany 
Also known as Industriegewerkschaft Metall (translated: “German 
Metalworkers’ Union”), IG Metall is the dominant metalworkers’ trade union in 
Germany and is currently both Germany’s and Europe’s largest industrial union with 
approximately 2.27 million members (Sackmann). 
IG Metall is a member of the Germany Confederation of Trade Unions 
(“Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund” or “DGB”) and experienced high membership 
among the Opel Bochum plant workers and plant stewards (historically upwards of 
80%) (Kirschbaum). Founded in 1949, the union represents workers from various 
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industries including mining, manufacturing and industrial production, machining, 
printing, steel production, and modern automobile manufacturing, along with various 
engineering and IT sectors. 
In order to understand the collective political bargaining power that IG Metall 
holds in Germany, it is important to note significant differences between trade unions 
in the United States and Germany. Typically, trade unions are much stronger and 
enjoy greater participation by employees in Germany than in the United States. While 
American trade unions remain a political factor, union membership peaked in the 
1950s in the United States and has been steadily declining as “right to work” laws are 
being adopted by an increasing number of states. However, a good contemporary 
American counterpart to IG Metall is the United Automobile Workers (UAW) union, 
founded in the 1930s as part of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). It is 
the most prominent union for automobile workers in the United States and currently 
has over 400,000 active members in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico (“Who 
We Are”). However, the UAW cannot quite compare to the scale of IG Metall, which 
represents the interests of 2.27 million members in Germany.  
Furthermore, German unions are characterized by a much higher degree of 
employee participation than those in the United States, up to and including co-
determination on a company’s board of directors, where works councils and trade 
union representatives sometimes receive full voting rights. Local works councils are 
also established by companies, and members are democratically elected by 
employees to represent their interests at a company level. These are often integral to 
the framework for defining working conditions and negotiating collective wage 
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agreements, and the thoroughly legally-defined and multilayer structure of employee 
participation in German trade unions has contributed to both their robustness and 
longevity. 
 
2.4 History of Opel in Bochum 
After the mining crisis in the 1950s that shut down most of the Ruhr valley 
region’s mining operations, Adam Opel AG quickly became the largest employer in 
Bochum after the establishment of the Opel Bochum plant in 1962 (Grebing and 
Hinse). The local economy restructured itself around Opel and other large industrial 
employers, making the well-being of the local economy largely dependent on the 
success of these employers (Badewitz).  
 The Opel Bochum plant was first opened on October 10th, 1962 with more than 
9,000 of their planned 14,000 initial employees being guaranteed job security in their 
plant (Zeitreise Bochum). After a few weeks, the Opel Bochum plant began producing 
almost 1,000 Kadett automobiles daily from the assembly lines (Praschma).  Three 
“sites” within the plant were subsequently established: one in Bochum-Laer, and two 
in nearby Bochum-Langendreer. Site I was responsible for the production of Opel’s 
automobile models (including their initial “Kadett” model), and Site II was 
responsible for producing engines and axles for the production network of GM 
Europe, whereas Site III was chiefly a support warehouse that distributed parts to 
Opel dealers worldwide. Opel participated in the local Bochum works council voting 
for the first time in 1962, when 87.3% of the works council were also members of the 
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IG Metall trade union. This indicates a longstanding effort by Opel to negotiate with 
local trade unions to settle worker disputes (Grebing and Hinse). 
Over its 52 years of continuous operation from 1962 to 2014, the Opel Bochum 
plant produced over 14 million cars. At times, over 22,000 workers were employed 
in the plant, and further tens of thousands of workers were employed in the region 
through the service or delivery of Opel parts/vehicles. When Opel retired the Kadett 
model in 1991, they had sold over 11 million Kadetts, 7.5 million of which had been 
produced at the Bochum plant. The infographic shown below in Fig. 2 was released 
by Die Welt in 2014 to show the varied lifespan of various Opel models that were 
produced at the Opel Bochum plant, as well as the approximate number of workers 
employed during the time of production of those models. 
 
 
Fig. 2: “Opel in Bochum.” Infographic. Die Welt. WeltN24 GmbH, 2014.  
Web. 5 Oct. 2015. 
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The Opel Bochum plant reached a peak employment of over 20,000 employees 
when the plant was producing the Ascona and Kadett/Olympia models in the 1970s. 
For decades, Opel Bochum was GM Europe’s largest production facility and 
still employed 19,200 employees both directly and indirectly in 1992, which was 
reduced drastically to around 3,500 direct workers by the time of the plant closure 
(Praschma). Over the course of its tenure, the Bochum plant was considered to be the 
“heart of Opel” as it was the primary manufacturer of the Kadett, Astra, and Zafira 
models (Einenkel). Their steadfastness led to their moniker of “Opel, der 
Zuverlässige” or “Opel, the reliable” in Bochum (Praschma). An aerial view of the 
plant’s property in Bochum-Laer is shown below in Fig. 3. 
 
  
Fig. 3: Tuxyso. Aerial Shot of Production Location of Adam Opel AG, Site I in Bochum. 
2014. Bochum. Wikimedia Commons, 2014. Web. 5 Oct. 2015. 
 
 After facing threats of closure for over 10 years, the last automobile rolled off 
the assembly line at the Opel Bochum plant on December 5th, 2014. The Opel Bochum 
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plant has since been listed in the Route of Industrial Culture (Theme Route: Bochum) 
since March 2014, when much of the Ruhr valley began to advertise its industrial 
culture in an effort to attract more tourism. By the end of June 2015, all of the property 
was closed, and the dismantling of the Lackiererei (paint shop) had already begun. 
The remaining buildings were symbolically sold to the “Bochum Perspective 2022” 
society for reuse in the future, although the demolition of most the plant sites is 
currently on hold, pending the outcome of litigation in the Düsseldorf Higher Regional 
Court in March 2016. The complete demolition is expected to then take approximately 
15 months to complete. The society is currently considering extending permanent 
monument status to the Opel administrative building, although their decision is not 
yet final, and they are also considering companies’ proposals to redevelop parts of the 
68 hectares (680,000 square meters) that was once the Opel Bochum plant.  
 
3. Underlying Causes Surrounding the Closure  
3.1 GM/Opel Insolvency and Contributing Factors 
While there were several contributing factors to the closure of the Opel 
Bochum plant, the primary root of the problems stemmed from the financial 
difficulties that GM experienced in the European car market, which were only further 
compounded by the United States’ economic crisis in 2008. GM Europe had been 
incurring losses since 1999, and GM Europe had made an estimated operating loss of 
€2 billion between 1997 and 2004 (“Planned Job Cuts”). Unfortunately, General 
Motors had been stuck for many years in a steady downward trend in Europe, forcing 
it to find ways to reduce operations in order to avoid going further into debt, and at 
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the time of the 2004 wildcat strike at the Bochum plant, workers at the Rüsselsheim 
and Bochum plants had the highest average wages of any Opel plant workers, making 
both plants prime targets for layoffs or closure (Blazejewski). Wildcat strikes in 
Germany are relatively rare, as they are unsanctioned strikes that are undertaken by 
unionized workers without the prior authorization of union leadership, and this 
particular wildcat strike put the spotlight on the tensions between GM Europe, IG 
Metall, and Opel Bochum plant workers, although this is discussed in a later section.  
Despite promising to keep the production of the Astra and Zafira models 
exclusively at Bochum until 2014 as stated in Opel’s European “Master Agreement”, 
Opel moved production of the Astra to Rüsselsheim between 2006 and 2008, and the 
chairman of the regional works council declared that “two Astra-plants in one country 
just won’t work”. The Bochum works council chairman Rainer Einenkel was also 
displeased and was quoted as saying, “we’re tired of being lied to… those who provide 
shitty quality are the ones allowed to build the cars”, remarking on how GM had 
broken its promise to Bochum by relocating the Astra model (Schaumberg). With this 
new broken promise from GM, the Opel Bochum plant was once again on the list of 
potential closures (Einenkel).  
The effects of the United States automobile industry and economic crises of 
2008 only compounded the financial difficulties that GM had been experiencing in 
Europe. The collapse of the “too big to fail” banks in the United States included the 
financial collapse of the financing company run by General Motors (formerly GMAC, 
now known as “Ally Financial”) (Amadeo). Furthermore, GM had already experienced 
a significant drop in sales in their most popular and profitable models (SUVs and 
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pickup trucks) due to the rising fuel prices from the earlier global energy crisis of 
2003-2008, as these models typically suffer from poor fuel economy and were 
subsequently hit the hardest in sales during the resulting automobile industry crisis. 
Although the 2008 financial crisis originated in the United States, it quickly developed 
into a global financial crisis because of the widespread effects of the collapse of 
several international financial institutions and led to what came to be known as the 
global “Great Recession” in the years that followed. While the GM headquarters 
focused on trying to manage and recover from the financial crisis in the United States, 
GM Europe felt particular pressure in trying to minimize losses in Europe so as not to 
intensify the financial pressures GM was already facing.  
However, GM Europe declared bankruptcy in 2009, and German regional and 
state governments rallied together to give Opel a bailout credit of €1.5 billion. Shortly 
thereafter on June 1st, 2009, the GM headquarters declared insolvency, whereupon 
the United States government effectively nationalized GM through a bailout of $51 
billion to GM and an additional $17.2 billion to GMAC to avoid the total collapse of GM 
and the loss of millions of U.S. jobs (Amadeo). To combat their bankruptcy and to 
accelerate their return to profitability, GM eliminated over 35,000 jobs worldwide 
and closed 17 plants in the US alone. Initially, GM sought to sell off Opel, but retracted 
this strategy in November and proceeded to pay back all loans to the German 
government (Einenkel). Despite these changes, GM and other multinational 
companies across the globe were still struggling to recover from the global economic 
downturn that occurred as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. The global economic 
downturn made it much more difficult for GM to bounce back, as it further hurt GM 
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sales and operations across the globe. Additionally, the European debt crisis that 
began to develop in 2009 and 2010 also fueled the economic instability of Europe, 
which also intensified general economic problems in the European market.  
Between 2007 and 2011, the Opel plants in Portugal, Belgium, England, and 
Sweden were closed or sold. In 2011 and 2012, General Motors was still in debt, and 
so the European Works Council decided to make political maneuvers in order to save 
other plant locations at the expense of closing the Bochum plant (Einenkel).  
These financial difficulties are partly a result of GM’s falling popularity with 
the European market, as their brand image had already been damaged over the years 
due to a variety of influences, including plant closures across Europe as well as a 
cultural disconnect in how the firm dealt with local trade unions and works councils. 
Another popular claim is that the model selection offered by GM Europe followed 
American tastes and thus did not sell as well in Europe. In a case study conducted 
about how GM and the other “Big 3” U.S. carmakers (Ford and Chrysler) lost their hold 
on the American car market, the author mentioned that one of GM’s fundamental 
problems in their global marketing strategy is that it prioritized industrial size in 
seeking to create “a car for every purse and purpose” and to be “all things to all 
people” instead of specializing in a single type of automobile as other car 
manufacturers often do (Maynard). The GM headquarters in Detroit and GM Europe 
were constantly struggling to determine the “right” branding strategy for the 
European market, and the failure of GM to tailor its product exclusively for the 
European market only contributed to the downward spiral of their sales in Europe.  
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Another popular claim is that the GM headquarters and GM Europe were 
constantly arguing over the proper calculation of profits and losses in the European 
branch. Some claimed that the reported losses of the GM Europe operations are 
mostly due to an inherently unfair accounting system and GM’s internal transfer 
pricing policy, although that is a separate discussion. Regardless, this long-standing 
quarrel combined with the untailored branding strategy greatly affected how the 
brand was perceived in Europe.  In a 2004 article, analysists said that GM had “no 
choice but to reduce its head count in Europe sharply, because… their image is so bad 
that they can’t sell their cars” (Landler, “Resentment Towards GM Grows”). Arndt 
Ellinhorst, an analyst at Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein in Frankfurt summed up the 
problem by stating, “[GM] really misread the market” (Landler, “Resentment Towards 
GM Grows”).  
There was also significant censure of the GM management style, as there was 
a distinct cultural disconnect when and how GM chose to announce the downsizing 
measures and eventual closure of the Bochum plant to the community and to its 
employees. Most significantly, the executives of General Motors chose to bypass and 
completely disregard the traditional German custom of initially negotiating 
downsizing measures with the local trade union (here, IG Metall) behind closed doors. 
Instead, General Motors relied on its American-style of management, which 
effectively announced cutbacks directly to the media and its employees without first 
negotiating measures with the workers’ trade union in the interest of promoting 
“transparency” in its decision-making process. In regards to this, Tony Cervone, a 
spokesman for GM Europe, stated “We pledge to speak to our employees first” and 
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that their handling of this situation was “based on a corporate culture that transcends 
national boundaries” (Landler, “Resentment Towards GM Grows”). The lack of regard 
for this time-honored German custom of trade union negotiations resulted in a large-
scale strike of workers who walked out of Bochum’s Opel plant for nearly a week in 
2004. They barricaded access to the plant, and the strike ultimately brought Opel 
operations in Europe to a halt, as the Bochum Opel plant was the supplier of many 
parts used at other European Opel plants. The political backlash against General 
Motors for their American-style labor-management relations further sent the 
demand for their vehicles into decline in an already shrinking European car market. 
The company’s failure to tailor its product and its management to European styles is 
part of the reason that the GM brands are continuing to decline in prominence in 
Western Europe. 
Similar carmakers such as Volkswagen have avoided this fate by addressing 
concerns directly through the local trade unions. In 2004, Volkswagen averted a full-
scale strike by offering factory workers a seven-year job guarantee in return for a 28-
month freeze in wages (Landler, “Volkswagen Averts Strike”). This deal was reached 
after a typical German bargaining marathon between company executives and the 
trade union; the goal was to reduce labor costs of the plant while maintaining labor 
harmony. The failure to maintain this harmony between the plant workers and GM 
management stoked the flames of dissent and was ultimately the death knell of the 
Bochum branch of Opel operations. Immediately following the end of the 2004 
wildcat strike on October 20th, 2004, Stern magazine published the following 
magazine cover, shown below in Fig. 4. 
20 
 
 
Fig. 4: Methode Wild-West (“Wild West Methods”). 2004. Magazine cover. Stern 
magazine, Oct. 2004. Web. 5 Oct. 2015. 
 
 Stern magazine is a weekly German news magazine that traditionally has 
published a leftist stance. In the accompanying article with this cover, Stern describes 
GM as the “brand killer from Detroit” that used “wild west” methods, suggesting that 
the anger at the newly announced GM cutbacks in Europe had taken on a distinctly 
anti-American flavor (Landler, “Resentment Towards GM Grows”). Many of those 
affected felt that the GM management was extorting its European workforce by 
threatening to move production to cheaper countries, and this perception further 
hurt GM’s brand image in the European market (Henning, “Germany: GM Opel”).  
Additionally, overcapacity at European plants has become a common issue for 
many automobile manufacturers, as demand has fallen sharply in past years, although 
high volume automobile manufacturers such as Opel and Peugeot have suffered the 
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backlash the most (Ewing). Other car manufacturers such as DaimlerChrysler and 
Volkswagen have dealt with falling profits by negotiating with the trade unions to 
provide smaller wage increases and other concessions while avoiding the relocation 
of production to cheaper countries. They made these concessions to avoid causing 
massive layoffs of European workers, which historically damage the brand image of 
companies within the European market (Landler, “Resentment Towards GM Grows”). 
Despite these setbacks, GM was able to recover enough financially through 
nationalization to be able to deploy large sums of money to implement “socially 
peaceful” downsizing in Europe in order to pursue more lucrative global markets 
outside of Europe (Schaumberg). These “socially peaceful” measures included large 
compensation packages to workers in exchange for voluntary layoffs at many plants, 
although these packages were not necessarily greeted with enthusiasm at most plants 
that faced closure. 
 
3.2 Strike in 2004 at Opel-Bochum Plant 
On October 14th, 2004, GM Europe announced a corporate restructuring plan 
with extensive job cuts, to the tune of 12,000 jobs in Europe, without prior 
consultation with union representatives. The GM chairman, Rick Wagoner, purposely 
did not exclude the possibility of a complete shutdown of a major European plant as 
part of this corporate restructuring plan (Blazejewski). As the Bochum plant 
employed approximately 10,000 workers at the time, Bochum workers were 
especially worried about layoffs and a factory closure, as GM had previously 
announced its intentions to move vehicle production to lower-cost sites in Eastern 
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Europe (Landler, “Impact of Opel Strike”). Like other cities in the Ruhr, Bochum had 
already experienced a heavy loss of industry, and the Opel plant was one of the few 
major employers left besides the Nokia plant and the Ruhr University Bochum. 
Although the Rüsselsheim plant chose to initiate negotiations between work councils 
and the GM management, the Bochum workers staged an illegal wildcat strike out of 
desperation to preserve their jobs. This is significant, as both German plants were 
under scrutiny for having the highest average wages at the time (Blazejewski), and 
thus were a source of potential cost savings for GM Europe.  
The Bochum plant’s radical approach to labor-management relations was 
likely inspired by a previous strike in Rheinhausen in 1987, when workers staged a 
160-day wildcat strike that involved over 100,000 people to protest the closure of a 
Krupp steel production plant. Although their actions only delayed the closure of the 
plant until 1993, the Rheinhausen strike became a symbol of solidarity and worker 
democracy in the region, and many former steelworkers from this plant later joined 
the Bochum Opel plant workforce (Blazejewski).  
However, the choice to strike appeared to lead to a bigger controversy over 
the “preferred” conflict strategy of negotiations, rather than ignite discussion on the 
original issue of corporate restructuring. Traditionally, companies open negotiations 
with the local works council and IG Metall representatives to reconcile differences; 
however, shop stewards at the Bochum plant sought open confrontation to induce 
radical change. This approach probably stemmed in part from frustrations over past 
negotiations that had failed, as Bochum had lost 10,000 jobs in negotiations between 
1992 and 2004, despite substantial worker concessions (Blazejewski).  
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The vast disconnect between the motives of local shop stewards and the 
official IG Metall functionaries also partially led to this controversial wildcat strike. 
Shop stewards are unique in that their role in German labor law is not fully defined, 
and they are therefore “unrestrained” by traditional labor law as the local works 
council and union representatives are. Although the shop stewards at the Bochum 
plant were necessarily members of IG Metall, their motive in continuing the wildcat 
strike was primarily to protect the jobs and income of their colleagues and the local 
plant, whereas IG Metall union officers at the time sought to preserve their own 
personal power and the union’s already tenuous role as a central player in the 
German industrial bargaining system, often at the expense of individual plants 
(Blazejewski). 
Thus, IG Metall and the local works council for Bochum both opposed the 
walkout, and on October 17th, 2004, the vice-chairman of IG Metall, Bertold Huber, 
publicly denounced the walkout as illegal. By speaking out against their own 
constituents in the Bochum plant, IG Metall sought to preserve their legitimacy as a 
labor union, as wildcat strikes are considered illegal under trade union law in Europe. 
A GM spokesperson downplayed the significance of the strike, saying that “with a 
couple more days of perspective, I think they’ll approach [the situation] differently”, 
whereas the head of the Bochum chapter of IG Metall said it wasn’t “a matter of time, 
but a matter of what’s the offer [from the company]” with regards to the duration of 
the strike, although they did not endorse their local workers’ actions (Landler, 
“Impact of Opel Strike”). 
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 The wildcat strike in Bochum lasted for a total of six days. Four days into the 
strike, operations in three other key Opel plants in Europe were forced to halt after a 
parts shortage that resulted from this wildcat strike. This parts shortage was due to 
the Bochum plant’s central position in GM Europe’s production network, and as such, 
the three sites of the Bochum Opel plant had varying levels of involvement in the 
wildcat strike. Site I, which produced the Zafira and Astra models at the time, was 
located 5km away from the other two sites and was somewhat disconnected from the 
strike. Site II, which produced axles and gearboxes for the GM Europe production 
network, was primarily responsible for the production halt at Opel plants in Germany, 
Belgium, and the UK during the strike. Site III mainly acted as a support unit which 
supplied parts to Opel dealers worldwide. Workers from Site II and Site III were the 
primary instigators of the strike as they felt they had the “least to lose” (Blazejewski).  
 On October 19th, a European “day of action” was organized to legitimize the 
unofficial strike as well as to allow IG Metall and the local works council to re-channel 
the strike activities and regain control of the strike narrative. The rally in Bochum 
was dominated by IG Metall banners, and none of the speakers at the rally were the 
local shop stewards (Blazejewski). On October 20th, the wildcat strike in Bochum 
ended after the results of a ballot were released, which indicated workers’ desires to 
end the strike. However, it is important to note that much speculation surrounds the 
legitimacy of this ballot, as the original question on the ballot was re-formulated from 
a simple question of whether or not the strike should continue to a two-part question 
that allowed only one answer. The re-formulated question read “Should the works 
council continue negotiations with management and should work be resumed? Yes 
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or no”, which excluded a crucial alternative of both continuing negotiations with 
management and continuing the strike. This manipulation of the ballot forced 
workers into an either/or situation, to which only 70% of workers replied “yes”. The 
questionable legitimacy of this ballot further strained relations between the local 
works council, shop stewards, and local workers, although the identity of the entity 
who changed the wording of the ballot remains unknown (Blazejewski).  
 Overall, GM was wholly unprepared to deal with this grass-root action in 
Bochum and was ultimately forced to compromise to the tune of €1 billion in 
compensation to the Bochum plant, further straining relations between the Bochum 
plant and GME (Blazejewski). Lingering frustrations and resentments on both sides 
of this conflict could very likely have been a contributing factor to GM Europe’s choice 
of closing the more lucrative Bochum plant as opposed to other European Opel plants.  
 
4. Reactions to Closure 
On December 5th, 2014, the last Zafira rolled off Opel’s production line in 
Bochum (The Associated Press and “In Bochum Rollt”), officially making Opel the first 
automobile maker to shutter a German plant in decades (Hetzner). The Opel Bochum 
plant workers, IG Metall, and the local Bochum and Ruhr communities all reacted to 
the closure in various ways.  
 
4.1 Opel Bochum Workers 
The initial reaction to the closure was a sense of betrayal. Two years before 
the closure, in December 2012, the Opel board of directors’ director, Sedran, was 
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criticized for arriving with over 70 guards in Bochum to announce that the “closure 
of Opel [in Bochum] is necessary for the rescue of Opel”, after which he promptly 
disappeared 7 minutes later. Local newspapers described his actions as “poor” and 
“cowardly” (Einenkel). Even Knut Giesler, who served on the regional IG Metall 
chapter, said that “an executive who tells workers that manufacturing will come to an 
end, only to then avoid a discussion by leaving through the emergency exit leaves a 
devastating impression behind him” (Hetzner).  
In the same month, workers were disgruntled when the 50th anniversary 
celebration of the Opel Bochum plant was cancelled by the same board of directors, 
as they decided that “Für Bochum geben wir kein Geld mehr aus!”, or simply “We are 
not spending any more money on Bochum!” (Einenkel). In January 2013, the IG Metall 
committee confirmed the end of car production at Bochum. At this time, 
approximately 87% of Opel Bochum plant workers were members of IG Metall, and 
survey results from the time showed they were incredibly disappointed and shocked 
by the decision from the other Opel locations to essentially abandon the Opel Bochum 
plant. Two months later, March 3rd was declared the “Day of Solidarity”, and Bochum 
experienced over 20,000 visitors. It was the biggest solidarity event up until that 
point in history in the Ruhr valley region (Einenkel). Many local artists participated 
and created art that represented the solidarity action they meant to support, such as 
the painting by local Bochum artist Bernd Röttgers in Fig. 5 below. 
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Fig. 5: Röttgers, Bernd. Wir Bleiben Bochum (“We’re staying Bochum“). 2013. 
Bochum Solidaritätsfest. Painting. www.wir-gemeinsam.eu. Web. 17 Mar. 2016. 
 
In his artwork, Röttgers captured both old and new Opel models and showed 
the integration of various Bochum landmarks alongside the Opel Bochum plant. He 
also used the Opel logo in the word “Bochum” to show the cultural significance of Opel 
in Bochum. 
In September 2013, workers at the Opel Bochum plant arranged a 17-hour 
long employee meeting, which turned out to be the longest meeting in the history of 
Opel. They discussed many topics, one of which was the possibility of striking, 
although this did not occur. On December 5th, 2014, car production in Bochum ended 
abruptly, and 3,500 people immediately lost their jobs. Approximately 2,700 
employees were sent to a “transfer company”, which is essentially a realm of waiting 
for further employment while collecting unemployment benefits (Einenkel).  
On December 15th, 2014, the last employee meeting was held at the Opel 
Bochum plant, with around 2,700 employees attending. Not a single member of the 
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board of directors or IG Metall union representatives were present, much to the 
workers’ disappointment. For their absence, Opel Bochum workforce and local media 
condemned Opel and IG Metall as “erbärmlich, unwürdig, und feige” (“envious, 
unworthy, and cowardly”) (Einenkel). The remaining employees in the transfer 
company continue to wait on future employment as promised by IG Metall and Opel 
as part of the plant closure. 
 
4.2 IG Metall (German Metalworkers’ Union) 
After the closure of the Bochum plant was announced in 2012, the head of IG 
Metall’s regional NRW chapter said he would continue to fight for manufacturing jobs 
in Bochum after 2016 —the original proposed date of the Opel Bochum closure— 
because “[IG Metall’s] goal is clear – no one should see the unemployment agency 
from the inside” (Hetzner).  
 However, after the disappointing outcomes of the 2000 and 2004 strikes in 
Bochum, there was little faith by the workers that IG Metall would mount a tough 
opposition to GM in response to the closure. No attempts were made to support a 
“national boycott action against Opel” or to host solidarity strikes in all factories, 
despite the demands from the disgruntled workforce. IG Metall and local works 
councils chose instead to focus on making sure Opel would “regain growth and 
profitability” (Schaumberg). Essentially, IG Metall sought to preserve their own 
regional bargaining power, even at the expense of renouncing actions of their own 
constituents in the Opel Bochum plant and eventually offering up the Opel Bochum 
plant for closure to appease GM management.  
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Longstanding criticism of their methods remain strong, with some socialist 
opponents labelling IG Metall as a “relic of the past”, insinuating that the trade unions 
“have become corporate co-managers, which organize job destruction and wage cuts 
and ensure that all opposition to these processes is suppressed in the factories” 
(Henning, “Germany: GM Opel”). However, sacrificing one location to preserve others 
is not unheard of in German trade union negotiations, especially when politics 
become involved, and IG Metall continues to bargain on the behalf of the remaining 
20,800 Opel Germany employees (Hetzner).  
 
4.3 Local Bochum and Ruhr community  
 For many Bochum locals, the loss of the Opel Bochum plant marked the loss of 
their identity, as Opel was integral to the cultural history of Bochum. The popular 
singer Herbert Grönemeyer aptly expressed this sentiment by stating that “Bochum 
is Opel and Opel is Bochum!” (“Das Detroit-Projekt”). Many locals even identified 
themselves as “Opelaners”, as supported by this photograph taken in 2014 in 
Bochum, shown below in Fig. 6.  
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Fig. 6: Wir Waren Opelaner mit Herz und Seele (“We were Opelaners with heart and 
soul“). 2014. Bochum. Photograph. Bochum Marketing GmbH, 2015. Web. 5 Oct 2015. 
 
Local newspapers lamented that “Opel hat sein Herz und seine Seele verloren” 
(“Opel has lost its heart and soul”) with the closure of the Opel Bochum plant 
(Einenkel). Over 20,000 people were directly and indirectly affected by the closure, 
which plunged Bochum into further deindustrialization (Praschma). 
To combat the loss of identity that many Bochum locals felt as a result of the 
closure, local Bochum artists and artists from three other Opel plants in Poland, Great 
Britain, and Spain came together to create a yearlong art project “We are not Detroit” 
with the Bochum Schauspielhaus and Urban Art Ruhr group. This initiative began on 
October 10th, 2013 —symbolic of the day that the Opel Bochum plant was founded— 
and continued until October 2014. The cover of the official festival program released 
for the main festival that took place from April 26th to July 5th, 2014, is shown below 
in Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 7: Schauspielhaus Bochum. Das Festivalprogramm von dem Detroit Projekt (“The 
Festival Program from the Detroit Project”). 2014. Bochum. Festival program cover. 
www.schauspielhausbochum.de. Web. 17 Mar. 2016. 
 
The primary focus of ‘The Detroit Project’ was aimed at encouraging locals to 
become “actors instead of victims of industrial change”, and thereby focused the 
project on regaining the lost identity of Bochum locals (“Das Detroit-Projekt”). 
Thus, the project did not aim to support Opel workers who were losing their 
jobs or “involve itself in a discussion intrinsically about Opel”, but rather to ask the 
question “What alternatives exist for the company’s sites, moving forward?” (Fuchs). 
When faced with the same deindustrialization that bankrupted the city of Detroit —
the home of GM’s international headquarters— these Bochum artists used this art 
project to inspire alternative uses for the abandoned Opel Bochum plant sites. 
Meanwhile, the local city council of Bochum worked with Opel to transfer ownership 
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of the Opel property to the “Bochum Perspective 2022” society in July 2015. This 
society was tasked with determining the fate of the 68 hectares of the former Opel 
Bochum plant property (Einenkel). 
 
5. Implications for the Future of Bochum 
 One year after the closure, the Opel Bochum plant is in ruins, and there are no 
new Opel jobs in sight as had been previously promised by IG Metall and GM Opel 
during the closure negotiations (Henning, “Opel Bochum”). In December 2015, 
approximately 2,700 of the remaining 3,500 workers from the Opel Bochum plant 
were placed temporarily in a transfer company. Trade unions have historically used 
these transfer companies to promise alternative jobs to prevent widespread 
resistance to mass layoffs in the industry. These transfer companies then try to 
retrain employees and place them back into the workforce at other plants, although 
the success has been limited in the case of the Opel Bochum plant. The majority of the 
remaining Opel Bochum workers were moved into the TÜV Nord Bildung [Education] 
GmbH, a two-year transfer company. However, 750 of them are over 55 years old and 
are part of an early retirement program. This means that most of the workers will 
take early retirement, the cost of which is a pension reduction of approximately 3.6% 
for every year they retire in advance of their normal pension age (Henning, “Opel 
Bochum”). Of the 2,700 employees moved into this transfer company, it is estimated 
that only 100 of those had found new employment as of December 2015 (Henning, 
“Opel Bochum”).  
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 It is important to note some key differences in the generosity of 
unemployment benefits in the US as opposed to Germany. Although it still depends 
on a variety of factors such as length of previous employment and age, German 
unemployment benefits include 60-67% of their previous net earnings for up to the 
first year of unemployment. When this runs out, the unemployed workers may then 
be eligible to claim an ongoing subsistence allowance through the “Hartz IV” reforms 
program if they are still fit to work and ready to step into any available job offered to 
them by the local employment office, or “Arbeitsamt”, although eligibility is limited 
by a number of factors (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Henkel). Comparatively, 
companies in the United States typically compensate unemployed workers for 40-
50% of the worker’s previous earnings for up to 26 weeks (one half-year), although 
this varies greatly by state (Dishman). Thus, while short-term unemployment for 
German workers is not ideal, workers can adjust to a reduced unemployment income 
temporarily as long as new employment can be found within that first year. The 
troubling trend in this situation is that many former Opel Bochum workers are still 
unable to find employment after an entire year with the TÜV Nord Bildung 
[Education] GmbH transfer company, sparking concerns about long-term 
unemployment in the absence of new industrial jobs.  
 The initial closure of the plant caused a spike in unemployment in Bochum, 
and many locals who were indirectly affected by the closure (typically those who 
worked in associated industries that serviced or delivered Opel automobiles and 
parts) had to seek other jobs in surrounding cities, which increased worker 
commutes and forced some to relocate altogether. The relatively recent closure of the 
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Nokia plant in Bochum in 2008 only compounded the effect of the Opel Bochum 
closure, as approximately 2,300 Nokia workers had already been placed in a 
temporary transfer company by IG Metall as part of the closure settlement of the 
Nokia plant (Henning, “Opel Bochum”). However, whereas the Nokia plant only 
employed approximately 4,000 workers at their height of their production, the Opel 
Bochum plant had operated for much longer and had employed over 20,000 workers 
at their height of their production (Ewing). Thus, the loss of the plant was felt both 
economically and culturally by Bochum locals.  
Meanwhile, the production of the Zafira model was moved to Opel’s 
headquarters in Rüsselsheim, and the demolition has begun on the sprawling plant 
buildings on the former Opel Bochum plant’s premises. Opel has kept a residual staff 
in Bochum to conduct administrative business, and Opel plans to keep its distribution 
center in Bochum-Langendreer, which currently employs around 700 locals. Opel 
hopes to invest €60 million in a new warehouse at this location in the future 
(Henning, “Opel Bochum”). 
 Following the closure, the land was symbolically sold to the “Bochum 
Perspective 2022” society, with the city council and Opel having 51% and 49% 
shareholding rights, respectively. This society is working to negotiate with companies 
to bring some business back to the region by redeveloping the land, although thus far, 
they have offered no substitutes for the well-paying industrial jobs lost in the plant 
closure (Henning, “Opel Bochum”). Furthermore, before the land is redeveloped for 
use by other companies, the city has to locate and fill old mine shafts and remedy 
mining damage that is present on the property, as they mined coal in the area as early 
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as 1742 (Toben).  Some of the demolition work on the sites is also currently halted 
pending the outcome of a court case in the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court that is 
scheduled to end in March 2016. An estimated 15 months of demolition is expected 
to follow before the land is safe to redevelop for alternative uses (Henning, “Opel 
Bochum”). The demolition of the paint shop at the Opel Bochum Site I began shortly 
after the plant closed, although progress is slow, as shown in this photograph taken 
from Wittener Straße at the end of March in 2015.  
 
 
Fig. 8: Cschirp. Abriss der Lackiererei des Opel Werks I in Bochum, Ende März 2015 
von der Wittener Straße aus gesehen. 2015. Bochum. Photograph. Wikimedia 
Commons. Web. 17 Mar. 2016. 
 
 Currently, approximately 14 hectares of the property have been sold to 
Deutsche Post DHL Group. DHL is currently the world’s largest courier company and 
plans to build a massive package distribution center on the premises (Toben). 
Construction is expected to officially start in the summer of 2017, and the finished 
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distribution center hopes to employ approximately 600 people at full working 
capacity. The final sorting capacity of the constructed plant is expected to reach 
somewhere in the range of 50,000 packages per hour, which would make it one of the 
most powerful courier distribution centers in Germany (Weeke). Unfortunately, 
although the redevelopment of a portion of the 68 hectares of the Opel Bochum plant 
property will bring jobs back to the area, jobs in the logistics sector tend to be much 
lower-paying and less secure than jobs in the production and processing sector 
(Henning, “Opel Bochum”). Thus, these logistics jobs cannot be expected to fully 
replace the income of those who lost their production jobs at the Opel Bochum plant. 
In December 2015, Bochum had an unemployment rate of 9.5%, although many locals 
hope that this statistic will decrease with the redevelopment of the plant property.  
 Although future GM-closures in Europe are still expected to happen if the 
downward trend in demand for GM vehicles continues, GM faces further damage to 
their brand image in the European market if they choose to outsource production for 
cost savings or political gain. In 2015 General Motors has pledged that workers at 
three other German Opel plants would not face any layoffs through 2018 (The 
Associated Press). This was a positive outlook; however, General Motors recently 
announced the sale of Opel and Vauxhall to Groupe PSA on March 6, 2017 for €2.2 
billion. Groupe PSA is a French automobile manufacturer that currently owns the 
brands Peugeot and Citroën, and spokesmen for the company say they are confident 
that they can engineer a positive turnaround to Opel’s past performance in the 
marketplace (DeBord). 
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6. Conclusion  
Throughout its 52 years of operation, the GM-Opel Bochum plant experienced 
remarkable successes and hardships. After the economic crisis over the transition 
from coal mining to oil and natural gas in the Ruhr valley region in the 1950s, the 
establishment of the GM-Opel Bochum plant gave former mineworkers new, secure 
jobs in the production and processing of automobiles and automobile parts. Beyond 
the plant itself, thousands of locals were also employed indirectly with the service 
and distribution of these automobiles and parts, and thus the GM-Opel plant in 
Bochum represented a substantial economic force in the region. For decades, the Opel 
Bochum plant was one of the most productive and lucrative plants in Opel’s portfolio 
but was constantly under pressure by GM to reduce labor and operating costs.  
 In the years that followed the largely unsuccessful wildcat strike at the plant 
in 2004, the Opel Bochum plant was constantly threatened with closure, as the 
damaged GM brand image contributed to GM’s growing losses in the European car 
market. After several broken promises, GM closed the Bochum plant rather abruptly 
in December 2014, leavings thousands of workers unemployed without offers of 
actual alternative jobs. The land on which the plant ruins now sit is currently owned 
by the “Bochum Perspective 2022” society, which will work with the city council and 
Opel representatives to seek out new companies to redevelop the land and bring 
industrial employment back to the region. The future of Opel in Germany overall is 
currently uncertain, as General Motors recently announced the sale of Opel to Groupe 
PSA, which currently owns the Peugeot and Citroën brands, but industry experts 
remain optimistic that Groupe PSA can turnaround some of Opel’s past losses.  
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 Schöningh, 1976. Print. 
Blazejewski, Susanne. “Actors’ Interests and Local Context in Intrafirm Conflict: The  
 2004 GM and Opel Crisis.” Competition & Change 13.3 (2009): 229-50. SAGE 
 Journals. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.  
Bundesagentur für Arbeit. "Unemployment Benefit II (Arbeitslosengeld II) / Social 
 Benefit (Sozialgeld)." Federal Employment Agency. Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 
 13 Feb. 2017. Web. 27 Mar. 2017. 
“Das Detroit-Projekt.” Schauspielhaus Bochum and Urbane Künste Ruhr, 2013. Web. 5 
 Oct. 2015.  
DeBord, Matthew. “GM is Selling Opel to Peugeot for $2.3 Billion.” Business Insider. 
 Business Insider, 6 Mar. 2017. Web. 18 Mar. 2017.  
Demographia: World Urban Areas, 12th Annual Edition. Wendell Cox Consultancy, 
 Apr. 2016. Web. 8 Aug. 2016.  
Dishman, Lydia. "How U.S. Employee Benefits Compare To Europe's." Fast Company. 
 Fast Company, 19 Feb. 2016. Web. 27 Mar. 2017. 
Einenkel, Rainer. “Die Opel-Seite: Wir Gemeinsam“. www.wir-gemeinsam.eu. Web. 26 
 Oct. 2015.  
39 
 
Ewing, Jack. "G.M.'s Opel Unit Reaches Deal to Close a German Plant." New York 
 Times International Business. The New York Times, 18 Nov. 2013. Web. 30 
 Oct. 2015. 
Fuchs, Sybille. “The ‘Detroit Project’ in Bochum.” World Socialist Web Site. 
 International Committee of the Fourth International, 12 Dec. 2013. Web. 5 
 Oct. 2015.   
Grebing, Helga, and Ludger Hinse. Träume Waren Partner Der Tränen: 100 Jahre 
 Gewerkschaft Metall Bochum 1892-1992. Bochum: Berg Verlag, 1994. Print. 
Henkel, Imke. "Unemployment Benefit: The View from Germany.” The Guardian. 
 Guardian News and Media, 20 June 2014. Web. 27 Mar. 2017. 
Henning, Dietmar. “Germany: GM Opel Plant Closure Exposes Bankruptcy of IG 
 Metall.” World Socialist Web Site. International Committee of the Fourth 
 International, 8 Dec. 2014. Web. 5 Oct. 2015.   
Henning, Dietmar. “Opel Bochum: Few New Jobs a Year After Plant Closure.” World 
 Socialist Web Site. International Committee of the Fourth International, 12 
 Dec. 2015. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.    
Hetzner, Christiaan. "Opel Sees No Alternative to Closing Bochum." Reuters.  
 Thomson Reuters, 10 Dec. 2012. Web. 26 Oct. 2015. 
“In Bochum Rollt der Letzte Opel vom Band“. Die Welt. WeltN24 GmbH, 26. Nov. 
 2014. Web. 5 Oct. 2015.  
Kirschbaum, Erik. “Moderate Head of Powerful German Union Steps Down 
 Unexpectedly.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 9 June 2015. Web. 5 Oct. 2015.  
40 
 
Landler, Mark. “Impact of Opel Strike May Spread.” The New York Times. The New 
 York Times, 19 Oct. 2004. Web. 5 Oct. 2015.   
Landler, Mark. "Resentment Toward G.M. Is Growing in Germany." The New York 
 Times: Business Day. The New York Times, 26 Oct. 2004. Web. 30 Oct. 2015. 
Landler, Mark. "Volkswagen Averts Strike by German Workers." The New York 
 Times: Business Day. The New York Times, 4 Nov. 2004. Web. 30 Oct. 2015. 
Maynard, Micheline. The End of Detroit: How the Big Three Lost Their Grip on the 
 American Car Market. New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2003. Print. 
"Planned Job Cuts at Opel Spark Widespread Protests." European Industrial Relations 
 Review 370 (2004): 7-8. Galileo. Web. 26 Oct. 2015. 
Praschma, Andreas Graf. “50 Jahre Opel Bochum: Hoffnungs- Und Leistungsträger 
  Für Eine Ganze Region.“ Wirtschaft Im Revier 6.68 (2012): 10-13. Print.  
Schaumberg, Wolfgang. "General Motors Is Attacking European Workers. Is There 
 No Resistance? The Example of Opel Bochum." Interface: A Journal on Social  
 Movements 6.1 (2014): 412-15. Galileo. Web. 26 Oct. 2015. 
The Associated Press. “GM Shutters Opel Plant in Bochum after 52 Years.” Federal 
  News Radio. Federal News Radio, 5 Dec. 2014. Web. 5 Oct. 2015.  
Toben, Helga. “Der Traurige Verfall von ,Opel-Werk 1’”. Die Welt. WeltN24 GmbH, 
 5 Dec. 2015. Web. 17 Mar. 2016.  
Weeke, Michael. “Der Abrissplan Für Das Opel-Werk 1 in Bochum Steht.“ WAZ. 
 Funke Mediengruppe WAZ, 7 Apr. 2016. Web. 02 Mar. 2017.  
“Who We Are.” UAW. United Automobile Workers. 22 Mar. 2017.  
41 
 
Zeitreise Bochum: Das Digitale Buch Zur Stadt. Bochum Marketing GmbH, 2015. Web. 
  5 Oct. 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
